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 2 
Summary  
 
The aim of the thesis is to examine the electricity market and the introduction of CO2-quotas. 
In order to perform this study, the text is divided into five main sections. The introductory 
section presents several assumptions that make it possible to model the quotas as an imposed 
unit tax on the producers of electricity. Section two consists of a thorough competition 
analysis. Section three examines the distinctive price formation in the market for generation 
of electricity, while section four presents empirical data from the early stages of the quota 
regime. This part of the thesis also uses the basis formed earlier in order to predict the price 
effects of the introduction of CO2-allowances. The concluding remarks summarize the 
findings, which show that the price for consumers will increase.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
 
The Nordic market for electricity is rather complex and has developed a great deal in recent 
years. In 1990 the Energy Act started the deregulation of the electricity sector. The structure 
of the markets went from closed national markets to an integrated Nordic market. In 1996 
Nord Pool was introduced. Nord Pool became the first multinational exchange for trade of 
electricity in the world. This exchange organizes buying and selling of electricity by receiving 
orders of supply and demand, and creating a system-price by matching these. The system-
price defines, at a given point in time, the price of transactions in the market for electricity the 
following day. This price will be referred to as the spot-price from now on. 
 
The production of the electricity traded on the exchange originates from several different 
production technologies (See figure 1.1). Roughly 55% of the electricity is generated from 
hydropower, while Nuclear power provides about 24% and thermal power 20%. Wind power 
also contributes, mostly from Denmark. These production technologies differ in many 
aspects, for example with regards to flexibility, emission of greenhouse gases and production 
costs. 
This diversity in production is a key to understanding the electricity market, and will be 
important during the work with this thesis. Figure 1.1 underlines the unique position that 
Norway holds in the Nordic market for generation of electricity.  
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Figure 1.1:  Distribution of production technologies.  
 
 
 
Source:  KT, “A powerful competition Policy, 2003 
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1.1 Motivation and Outline  
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to uncover what effects the introduction of quotas for emission of 
CO2   has on the prices in the Nordic electricity market. As previously mentioned, this market 
is somewhat complex and plays an important role regarding emissions of climate gases and 
the problems associated with those. The goal for this thesis is to obtain an understanding of 
this interesting market, in addition to investigating the consequences of the quotas. 
 
 In response to the Koyoto-agreement the EU introduced the ETS, the European trading 
scheme. Quotas for emission of CO2 were allocated to actors based on historical emissions. 
The general idea of the system is to exploit market mechanisms to reduce the emission of 
gases dangerous to the environment. In order for this to work, the allocation needs to create a 
shortage of quotas. Then the quotas will attain a value in the market. By this, emission of   
CO2 will imply a cost for actors in the market. The EU is hoping that the introduction of the 
ETS will help to reduce future emission. This introduction of quotas will have a significant 
impact on the market for electricity. Generation of thermal electric power is the largest 
contributor to emission of greenhouse gases. This gives hold to my strong motivation to 
examine the electricity market in general, as well as the specifics of the quota system. 
 
 The first period of the ETS finished at the end of 2007. In retrospect, this first part of the 
project cannot be considered a complete success. The allocation of the quotas was too 
generous, and as a result of that the price of the quotas at the end of the period was close to 
zero. Nevertheless, a market infrastructure was established during the trial period. The volume 
of trade was also increasing by the end of the first phase. These are indeed positive signs for 
the future development of the quota-system. The second part of the ETS was launched at the 
start of 2008. The distribution of quotas is now by means of auctioning. This new approach to 
allocation will hopefully lead to increased values of the quotas and an effective distribution, 
and thereby a greater chance of the project reaching its objective.  The performance of the 
ETS is being monitored by public officials around the world, and its success will increase the 
chances of establishing a global system in the fight against climate change. This further 
underlines the motivation for this thesis.  
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The introduction of this thesis will continue with the presentation of the effects of the quotas 
in an ideal world of perfect competition. Section two will consist of a thorough competitive 
analysis of the Nordic electricity market. An overview of the competitive environment will 
provide a useful basis in order to examine the effects of the quotas. Section three will 
elaborate in detail on the price setting mechanisms. A focal point here will be to establish the 
price effects of the CO2-allowances on the Nordic electricity price. The Nordic price is 
formed on the basis of a quite complex set of factors. These will be discussed in section three. 
Section four will introduce the quotas. Firstly, a descriptive part concerning the experiences 
thus far will be presented, as well as data on prices and volumes in the newly established 
market for emission trading. The final part of the section will use the results from previous 
sections in order to determine the price effects. Section five will present the conclusions based 
on the discussion in the previous sections.  
 
 
 
1.2 The Impact of CO2-quotas in an Ideal World of Perfect 
Competition 
 
 
The Nordic electricity market has several distinctive characteristics that effect the competitive 
environment. Different production technologies, capacity constraints in the cross-border 
transmission grid and market concentration are all factors that make the competitive situation 
illusive. These topics will be discussed thoroughly later in the thesis in order to form a basis 
for further understanding the effects of the quotas. Even though the Nordic market for 
electricity generation hardly resembles a market with perfect competition, it is useful as a 
benchmark to study our problem in the stylized world of perfect competition. 
 
Perfect competition is rarely or never observed in its purest form; however it is often a useful 
approximation. Several requirements need to be fulfilled in order for a market to  be perfectly 
competitive. Firstly the goods produced in the market must be homogeneous or perfect 
substitutes. Secondly, consumers must not be restrained by switching costs. This means that 
consumers can switch to another supplier without encountering costs in the form of money, 
time consumption or other transaction costs.  A third point regarding customer power and the 
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demand side of the market is perfect information. If consumers are able to exploit the absence 
of switching costs to respond to a higher price from one producer, the market must be 
transparent. The producers as well as the consumers need to have access to all information 
regarding price changes. If these conditions are fulfilled, producers cannot raise prices 
without losing customers. Also, suppliers and buyers must take the market price as given.  
 
Perfect competition means absence of market power. One way of defining market power is 
that a player in the market can raise the price level by a given interval without losing market 
shares. Market power is an obstacle to competition. In addition free price formation and 
profit-maximizing actors in the market will enhance perfect competition. Profit maximizing 
actors is a basic assumption in economics, and free price formation demands the absence of 
government regulation. The last condition worth noting on the supply side is the lack of entry 
barriers. Incumbents in a market will be disciplined by the fact that new entrants can establish 
themselves if the business is profitable.  
 
Consequently there are strict conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to obtain perfect 
competition in a market. These factors enhance the competitive environment and will lead to 
tougher price competition. The actors in the market can not raise its price without losing 
customers. When considering a situation with only two players in a market, both competitors 
will have an incentive to cut their prices marginally (epsilon) below the market price, and 
thereby capturing the whole market. Game theory illustrates these mechanisms. Based on the 
assumption that all competitors are aware of and have the same incentives, the only long term 
equilibrium is price equal to marginal cost.  
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Figure 1.2:  Bertrand Paradox 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 shows the only long-run equilibrium in a market with perfect competition and with 
equal and constant marginal costs on the supply side. In a Nash-equilibrium the players do not 
regret their choice given their competitor’s actions. There is no profit for producers and the 
quantity covers demand in a satisfactory way. This perfect competition equilibrium 
maximizes economic welfare. The dynamics of the game mechanisms that lead to the solution 
of the tough price competition are shown formally below the figure.  
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We rarely observe this type of situation because of the strict conditions that were discussed 
above. However, for the purpose of this thesis it is useful to study the effects of the quotas in 
this hypothetical scenario. The introduction of CO2-quotas can be viewed as a tax imposed on 
production of electricity which leads to emission of climate gases. The producers thus face an 
externally imposed cost tied to their production. The size of this cost will depend on the 
emission level tied to the production, as well as the market price of the C02-allowances.  The 
quotas are analogous to a unit tax. There is one vital assumption worth noting in order to 
claim that the quotas can be modeled as a unit tax. The quantity of emission needs to be 
constant per unit of output (electricity). This is indeed true for generation of electricity. The 
emission level is a linear function of production.  
 
The emission of climate gases now includes a cost for producers, and thereby raises the 
marginal cost of production. This cost increase can come as a direct effect when actors 
purchase quotas at market price, or as an opportunity cost as the quotas can be sold in the 
market. The latter implies that there is a cost involved even though a hypothetical producer is 
allocated quotas that covers its need free of charge. Another implication of the opportunity 
cost is that it enables us to model the price effects of the quotas with a model of a tax imposed 
on producers. This model will be presented below, but firstly two different alternatives for 
market intervention regarding externalities will be given attention. 
 
Problems in the form of externalities arise when the activities of individual market 
participants affect surroundings which are of public interest in a negative way. The incentives 
of individual actors differ from the interests of the general public. Emission of climate gases 
is an example of this. There is a need for market intervention in order to handle this kind of 
problem. When faced with emissions, two different approaches are usually considered:  One 
is imposing direct taxes on emission. The other is a quota based approach, which is the 
relevant scenario in this thesis. It is argued above that the price effects of both alternatives can 
be modeled the same way. Nevertheless, it is useful to pinpoint the differences between direct 
taxation and allocation of allowances.     
 
There are often two main differences brought forward concerning quotas versus direct 
taxation. Allocation of quotas that are non-tradable leads to an ineffective distribution. 
Officials who impose the quotas do not have information regarding the cleaning costs, and the 
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market participants do not have incentives to reveal this information. The main problem with 
taxation is that it is impossible to control the level of emissions accurately. The 
ineffectiveness of the quota approach can be solved by making the quotas tradable. This has 
been done with the ETS. This implies that the cost effectiveness is not an argument favoring 
direct taxation. The discussion is thereby dependent on the trade-off between the need of 
control of emission levels and the incentives to invest in cleaning technology given to market 
participants. Direct taxation will give a larger incentive to invest in cleaning technologies. The 
incentive to invest in cleaning technology for market participants, is solely dependent on the 
cost imposed from emission of climate gases. This cost is represented by the size of the tax, or 
in the quota scenario, by the market price of the quotas. When market players invest in 
cleaning technology, the demand for quotas will be reduced and the optimal level of emission 
will be higher with a quota-based system. When producers are faced with an imposed tax, the 
cost of emission is given by the size of the tax. This is decided by the government, in other 
words externally, and there will not be an equilibrium effect increasing the optimal level of 
emission: 
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Figure1.3:
 
 
Figure 1.3 is meant to illustrate the reasoning above. The profit from investing in cleaning 
technology is given by the difference of the old and the new marginal cleaning cost curves. 
For the quotas there will be an equilibrium price-effect represented by the dashed lines. The 
value of the quotas will decrease because of reduced demand for quotas. As a result there will 
be less cleaning and more emission compared to the tax solution.  
 
 
The view of this thesis is that for a given cleaning technology, a quota-based approach to the 
emission problem is optimal. It is vital that government officials can monitor the emission 
level for the ETS to be credible. The trading scheme is based on clear-cut quantitative goals as 
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formulated in the Koyoto- agreement, and a quota-system is efficient in fulfilling these 
requirements. Hence, the two different tools for fighting climate changes can be modeled the 
same way (See discussion above). The price effect of a government-imposed tax is a well 
known problem in micro-economics, and is presented below: 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Tax imposed on production 
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Figure 1.4 shows the theoretical effects from quotas from this simple approach to the 
problem. The producers and the consumers will split the downside effect of the increase in 
production costs and there will be a higher price and a lower quantity of electricity in the 
market. For simplicity, the figure is meant to be symmetrical around P0. The simple figure is 
not meant to explain the exact size of the effects of the tax. This will depend on elasticity of 
supply and demand. The interval between the new price for the suppliers (Ps) and the new 
price for the buyers (Pb), is equal to the tax imposed on the producers. The loss of consumer 
surplus is given by the sum of the top rectangle and triangle. Accordingly, the loss of 
producer surplus is the bottom rectangle plus triangle. The deadweight loss is graphically 
illustrated by the two triangles. The deadweight loss is derived by the consumer and producer 
surplus, less the increased government income, which is the sum of the two rectangles. This 
result is interesting in itself, but for the purpose of this thesis it is worth noting that these 
results do not consider the elasticity of demand. The elasticity is important to examine in 
order to forecast to what extent the producers succeed in transferring the burden of the tax on 
to the consumers.  If the elasticity of demand for electricity is inelastic, which is not far from 
the truth for the electricity market, at least in the short run, we will probably observe a greater 
increase in price and a more stable level of quantity. The slope and structure of the supply-
curve will also affect the results presented in the figure.  
 
 
In equilibrium: 
 
( ) ( )s dQ p t Q p 
        (1.2.1)            
 
We are interested in the change in consumer price in response to a change in tax imposed: 
 
'( 1) '( )S D
dp dp
Q Q p
dt dt
          (1.2.2) 
 
Solving for the change in consumer price with respect to change in tax imposed yields: 
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The two latter expressions show the extreme scenarios. When either supply or demand is 
completely inelastic we have a horizontal supply curve or a vertical demand curve. An 
inelastic supply implies that producers carry the whole burden of the tax. Conversely, an 
inelastic demand causes the burden to be absorbed by the consumers. The figure above is 
meant to illustrate these mechanisms in a neutral way. In other words, it is not meant to 
illustrate the characteristics of the electricity market in any way. From the last equation we 
can derive the theoretical expression for this scenario: 
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Q
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Expression (1.2.4) indicates that when assuming supply and demand is equally elastic, the 
derivative of the consumer price with respect to the tax imposed equals 0.5. This implies that 
the burden of the tax is evenly shared between consumers and producers.  
 
The above paragraphs indicate that the characteristics of the electricity market concerning 
elasticity are important. Discussions regarding the supply and demand of the electricity sector 
will be elaborated in the next section. The lesson learned from this simplified example is 
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perhaps limited, but we can draw the conclusion that producers which face an externally 
imposed cost will try to make the consumers carry the load. To what extent they succeed will 
depend on the structure and competitive environment of the market. The next section will 
discuss this in further detail, but firstly a final preliminary factor needs to be addressed. 
 
A model which describes the future structure of the electricity market has been established. 
An obstacle is to translate the value of the quotas, which is denominated in Euro/metric ton, to 
Euro/MWh. The carbon intensity of electricity production is the variable we are looking for. 
We will use coal based production as the relevant benchmark. Støyva (2005)
1
 reports that the 
emission from a coal based power plant emits 0.321 tons CO2 in the production of one MWh 
of electricity. This presupposes 100% effect of the power plant, which will never be the case. 
The efficiency of the power plants varies surprisingly. Støyva reports that in 2005 Danish 
thermal production had an average efficiency of roughly 65 %, while Germany could only 
manage around 35%. This efficiency measure says how much output the power plants 
generate for one unit of input (Coal). The carbon intensity is derived by dividing the emission 
level of a 100% power plant with the relevant estimate of efficiency for a representative coal 
based power plant. For the purpose of this thesis the efficient Danish plants will be an 
appropriate approximation. The reason for this assumption is that with the emergence of the 
quota-regime, the least efficient production facilities will probably become obsolete. It will be 
too costly to maintain production with unnecessary high emission levels. Therefore, the 
estimate of the carbon intensity of electricity production in this thesis is  
 
(0.321/0.65)t/MWh = 0.49t/MWh 
 
This would mean that with 100% transfer of the quota price to the electricity price, a quota-
price of 25 EUR/t would imply an increase of roughly 12 EUR/MWh in the electricity price. 
Before we can say anything about the price effects of the quotas, the competitive environment 
must be examined.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Støyva G, (2005), “CO2-kvotenes innvirkning på den Nordiske kraftprisen”, 
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2.0 Competition Analysis of the Nordic Market for 
Electricity 
 
 
In order to draw any further conclusion from the effects of the CO2-quotas on the electricity 
market, one needs to examine the distinctive characteristics of this market. The purpose of 
this section is to clarify to what extent the competition is well functioning. The a priori idea is 
that if the market has features that resemble perfect competition, the quotas have a greater 
chance of reaching its objective. If market power is observed in the market, the producers 
have greater means to make the consumers carry the extra cost of the quotas. An actor which 
possesses market power can raise its price without losing market shares. This scenario will 
lead to higher prices in the electricity market, but will not necessarily lead to a significant 
shift in production.  The objective of the quota- system is of course to twist the production of 
electricity towards production technologies that lead to less emission of climate gases. It 
would also be beneficial if the introduction of the quotas causes a decrease in the consumption 
of electricity. However, this scenario is considered to be less likely, as it is difficult to imagine 
that the public is willing to reduce its consumption significantly. This will depend on the 
elasticity of demand.  
 
With the basic assumption that competition-hindering features will have a negative effect on 
the objective of the quota-system, this section will shed light on the competitive environment 
of the Nordic electricity sector.  
 
 
2.1 Relevant Product Market 
 
 
Defining the relevant product market is a necessary first step in order to perform a 
competition analysis. When defining this market, one is interested in the smallest possible 
market in which a hypothetical monopolist can exploit its dominant position.  The European 
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Commision has defined this market as the sale of electricity through high-voltage network.
2
 
There are no close substitutes for electricity today. The demand is inelastic, especially in the 
short run. Consumers are not able to monitor price changes from hour to hour, and they do not 
have many alternative sources of energy. Based on these arguments we can establish that 
wholesale of electricity is a separate product market. The producers in the wholesale market 
could increase prices without consumers switching to alternative energy sources, at least in 
the short run.  
 
The wholesale market is thus defined as a separate market, but we need to examine whether 
this is the smallest possible relevant market.  As noted in the introduction, the wholesale 
market is structured both as bilateral contacts as well as trade on the Nord Pool exchange.  
Producers of electricity sell their product to large end-users and power suppliers through both 
these outlets. Figure 2 gives an overview of the distinctive structure of the market: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The Norwegian Competition Authorities, (2003),”A Powerful Competition Policy”  
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Figure 2.1: The structuring of transactions in the Nordic electricity market.  
 
Source: Based on a diagram from KT (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 The bilateral and Nord Pool markets are separate markets if an actor can raise the price 
within one of these markets without customers switching to the other arena. This question is 
somewhat difficult to answer due to the lack of transparency in the bilateral market. There is a 
large diversity of contracts in the bilateral market. The time frame of the contracts in the 
bilateral market will also play a role in the consideration of this market. The longer the 
horizon of the contracts, naturally, the more difficult it would be to switch to the spot market. 
Nevertheless, an important feature of these contracts is that they are usually structured with 
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the Nord Pool spot price as a basis for price formation. In addition, the spot price is available 
for all parties to see. Both these factors will make it difficult for a hypothetical monopolist to 
raise prices without losing profit from customers switching market place. When following this 
reasoning, the bilateral market and the spot market belong in the same relevant product 
market.  
 
There are thus arguments in favor of considering the bilateral and spot markets as belonging 
to the same relevant market. This view is shared by the Norwegian and Danish competition 
authorities. When considering the case of Statkraft´s acquisition of Agder Energi and 
Trondheim Energiverk, the Norwegian competition authority concluded that the bilateral and 
the spot market were close substitutes and therefore belonged to the same market. The Danish 
authorities came to the same conclusion when dealing with the abuse of dominant position by 
two market participants in Denmark
3
 
 
There are reasonable arguments in favor of accepting the bilateral and the spot markets as 
belonging to the same relevant market. This approach will be employed in this thesis.  
 
 
 2.2 Relevant Geographic Market 
 
 
In the sub-section above we found the relevant product market to be the wholesale market for 
sale of electricity. The next step in the analysis is to determine the relevant geographic 
market. Before the deregulation of the electricity sector, the Nordic markets were closed and 
strictly national. It would be tempting to claim that the Nordic market after the deregulation is 
a totally integrated market, and thus that the relevant geographic market is the Nordic 
countries. However, the solution to this problem does not present itself easily.  
 
Even though water can be stored, the product of electricity is impossible to store. It has to be 
consumed the moment it is delivered. This time dimension is important because it influences 
the extent of the geographic market. There are at times constraints in transmission capacity 
between different regions in the Nordic market. These constraints are often referred to as 
                                                 
3
 KT (2003) 
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“bottlenecks”. These bottlenecks will at certain hours divide the Nordic region into several 
different price areas, or different relevant geographic markets. This special feature of the 
electricity sector offers challenges when studying the market from a competition point of 
view. Usually, competition authorities require geographic markets to be stable over time in 
order to establish abuse of a dominant position.  Because of the congested transmission grid, 
this is not possible in the market for generation of electricity. Nevertheless, it is important to 
establish the smallest possible area where a hypothetical monopolist can raise its price without 
losing market shares. The different price areas which arise in times of congestion, are clearly 
markets where such a monopolist can abuse a dominant position. This is the case both in 
surplus areas and in deficit areas. In surplus areas the producers are net exporters, and a 
dominant actor can withhold production to maintain the price in the area at an acceptable 
level. In a deficit area, where imports are limited, the leading market participant can raise its 
price without losing market shares to surrounding price areas.  
 
These price areas can often be observed directly from Nord Pool. In these cases, the price 
areas are treated as different El-spot areas on the Nord Pool exchange. When the price areas 
cannot be observed on the exchange, the price areas are dealt with by the means of counter-
trade. This implies that the Nordic TSO’s sell and buy electricity on both sides of the 
bottleneck in order to reduce the effects of the congestion. This is often done in order to 
complete the announced trade on Nord Pool in line with the 36-hour guarantee
4
  
The problem when trying to define the relevant market arises because of the uncertainty 
related to the time horizon of the congested transmission grid. Copenhagen Economics (2002) 
performed a study where they quantified the different price areas in the Nordic electricity 
sector in 2001.  
 
The results obtained by Copenhagen Economics
5
 (2002) show that the market is divided into 
different price areas about 50% of the time. These figures will vary from year to year due to 
large variations in precipitation. The relevant geographic market was, for example, smaller 
than the Nordic region about 65% of the time in 2002. As we can see, it is difficult or 
impossible to accurately define the relevant geographic market. Before finishing this 
discussion concerning the geographic markets, it is worth noting that the Nordic transmission 
                                                 
4
 Energinet.dk 07.08.07 
 
5
 The Norwegian Competition Authorities, (2003),”A Powerful Competition Policy” 
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grid is connected to continental Europe via Denmark. One could argue that the relevant 
market is even larger than the Nordic region. Several studies have shown that this is not the 
case.  The approach that will be used in the further elaboration of this thesis is that the 
relevant market is smaller than the Nordic region.   
 
 
 
 
 
 2.3 Market Concentration 
 
 
The previous sub-sections have formed a basis needed to embark on an analysis of market 
concentration and possible dominant positions in the market. As noted above, the relevant 
product market is considered to be wholesale of electricity, and the relevant geographic 
market is smaller than the Nordic region. The smallest markets are defined. The task ahead 
consists of trying to establish whether any actors within these markets have a dominant 
position enabling them to abuse market power. With our assumptions of rational actors, a 
dominant position will automatically lead to abuse of this position.  
 
The process of estimating market concentration is often relatively straight forward. Market 
shares are the basis of the calculation. The total market shares are accumulated and compared 
to threshold values in order to determine whether the market is unconcentrated, moderately 
concentrated or highly concentrated. The picture becomes somewhat more complicated when 
applying this method to the Nordic electricity market. There are several factors which add to 
the difficulty of calculating market concentration. Firstly, the ownership of power plants is 
often structured as joint ownership. Market shares in the electricity sector are usually 
calculated as each actor’s share of production or installed capacity. When two or more 
production companies have shares in the same plant, it is difficult to estimate market shares. 
The solution is often to determine the owner who has control over the plant and consider that 
company to fully own the power plant.  In addition to joint ownership, there is a great deal of 
cross ownership in the Nordic market for generation of electricity. Cross ownership can be 
either direct or indirect. The relationship is direct if one company owns shares in another 
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company competing in the same market. Indirect ownership occurs when a company owns 
shares in a competitor, which in turn owns part of a third party.  
 
The ownership structure in the Nordic market makes the calculation slightly complicated, but 
the Norwegian competition authorities (KT) performed a thorough study on this topic in 2003. 
In addition to this report, SNF published an article on commission from KT about ownership 
relations and cooperation in the Norwegian Power market
6
. I will present the results on 
market concentration from these two publications in this sub-section.  
 
 
2.3.1 The Herfindahl index  
 
The most commonly used tool for quantifying market concentration is the Herfindahl index 
(HHI). The model is simple in its mathematical form, and is defined by the sum of the squared 
market shares of all market participants: 
 
2( )
n
i
i
HHI   
 
 Since the terms in the equation are squared, the model emphasizes the larger market shares. 
The HHI will be noted in whole numbers, with market shares presented as percentage sizes. A 
market with an HHI of less than 1000 is considered to be unconcentrated. A moderately 
concentrated market will have an HHI roughly between 1000 and 1800, while a highly 
concentrated market is above 1800. The companies are treated as strictly independent when 
computing the HHI. For the electricity sector this can lead to inaccuracy. This market is 
characterized by a great deal of cross ownership. The companies may therefore have fewer 
incentives to compete. If one actor in the market raises its price, the loss of profit from lower 
sales will be partly eliminated by a corresponding increase in sales for a competitor, in which 
the first company has ownership interests. This effect is referred to as the incentive-effect. 
Another effect caused by the high degree of cross-ownership is the control effect. If one 
company has direct control over a competitor in the market, it can coordinate the actions of 
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the two actors in the market, and thereby maximize its profit. This will naturally hinder 
competition. 
 
KT (2003) calculated the HHI and adjusted for both the effects described above. 
The results are presented in this table: 
  
 
 
 
Table 2.1 
 HHI HHI HHI 
Finland 1766 2037 3005 
Norway 1634 1980 3325 
Sweden 2893 2923 2988 
Denmark 4844 4844 4844 
The Nordic Market 892 989 1138 
Source: KT (2003) 
 
 
The effects of cross-ownership in the electricity sector can be clearly observed from the 
results presented in the table 2.1. The unadjusted HHI shows the markets to be moderately 
concentrated, with the exception of Sweden and Denmark. The HHI adjusted for the 
incentives-effect as well as the control-effect tells another story. All the national markets are 
now well above the threshold for being highly concentrated. 
 
 In Norway the government-owned Statkraft has a dominant position. KT estimated their 
annual average production capacity to be 34.7 TWH, and KT also found that it had an 
installed capacity of 8356 MW. This would imply a market share of installed capacity to 
exceed 40%. This number is adjusted for direct ownership of other market participants. The 
calculation of indirect ownership would increase this figure further.  
 
The extent of cross-ownership is smaller between countries in the Nordic region. Therefore 
the increase in the adjusted HHI is not as dramatic as for the national markets. The discussion 
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above regarding the relevant markets of the Nordic electricity sector leads to the conclusion 
that the relevant markets are smaller than the whole Nordic region. In fact, we found that the 
relevant markets are often smaller than the national markets. The most interesting result is the 
observation of the highly concentrated national markets.   
 
Based on the discussion concerning the relevant markets and the study on market 
concentration performed by KT, we have established that there is an environment where 
market participants can exploit a dominant position. In the Norwegian market this player 
would be Statkraft. Stakraft will naturally claim that as a government-owned company, it has 
no incentive to abuse a strong position in the Norwegian market. Nevertheless, as a 
commercial actor, it has a basic motive to maximize their profit.  
 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to explore the grey areas of optimizing production in 
contrast to the abuse of a dominant position. Rather, the goal of this work is to uncover the 
effects of the CO2-quotas on prices and production in the market for generation of electricity. 
With this in mind, establishing a highly concentrated market is relevant. In the first section we 
studied the effect of the quotas in the hypothetical scenario of perfect competition. A highly 
concentrated market entails that the conditions for free competition are far from fulfilled. This 
will have a significant effect on the discussion of the quotas. The definition of abuse of 
market power that we have used before, is that a company will withhold production in order 
to maintain a high price. In other words, the company will try to get as close as possible to the 
monopoly solution. A market participant with market power can do this without losing profit 
due to the loss of market shares. The introduction of CO2-quotas can be viewed as a 
government-imposed tax on the producers of electricity. In the case of perfect competition the 
producers and consumers would to a varying degree, share the burden of this tax.  The 
scenario with imperfect competition is far more complex. An a priori discussion about the 
price-effects of quotas is difficult. We have established that the market is concentrated and 
that Statkraft enjoys a dominant position in the Norwegian sector. That does not necessarily 
mean that they can exploit their market power. This question partly depends on the demand 
side of the market. The next sub-section will draw attention to this aspect. Furthermore the 
role of price-setter is needed in order to abuse a dominant position. In dry years Norway 
experiences a power deficit and depends on import of electricity from surrounding areas. In 
wet years one gets a power surplus and corresponding lower prices compared to other Nordic 
countries. The congestion of the transmission grid, will provide market actors within one price 
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area the capability of influencing the price within that relevant market. The intuitive approach 
is that the greater the number of hours that the transmission grid is congested, the more 
independent the price in a region is of the surrounding areas. This argumentation implies that 
the price in the Norwegian sector will be less influenced by the introduction of quotas, 
because the price will be set independently in areas without production based on fossil fuels.  
In order to elaborate this discussion, the next sub-section will supply an overview of the 
demand side of the market.  
 
 
 
2.4 The Demand Side of the Nordic Electricity Sector 
 
 
The discussion above found that the national markets in the Nordic region are highly 
concentrated, and that Statkraft enjoys a dominant position in the Norwegian market. In order 
to further elaborate our discussion we need to establish a link between market concentration 
and market power. The elasticity of demand is important when trying to accomplish this.  
The Lerner index gives us a simple formal expression for the connection between market 
concentration and market power: 
 
HHI
L

      The term epsilon refers to the elasticity of demand. 
 
The rationale behind this simple equation is that a highly concentrated market gives the 
market participants with large market shares an advantage compared to their competitors. 
Thus, a large value for HHI in the denominator will increase the Lerner index. On the other 
hand, if a dominant actor in the market faces an elastic demand, its opportunities to exert 
market power will be limited. Formally, elastic demand will give a flatter demand-curve. 
Producers can not raise its price significantly without losing profit from the loss of sales.  The 
elasticity of demand is the numerator in the expression above, and will reduce the market 
power of a dominant actor in a market.  
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The use of the Lerner index is useful in its simplicity, but the whole picture is a bit more 
complicated.  Ability to exert market power will depend of the elasticity of the residual 
demand. The residual demand curve will determine the optimal allocation in a price-quantity 
diagram for an individual producer.  Residual demand is given by total market demand less 
the supply given by other producers at a given price level: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )i jj iq p D p S p       (2.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
The expression for the elasticity of demand: 
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        (2.4.2) 
 
 
There are several factors which influence the residual demand. First of all, the elasticity of the 
market demand as a whole will affect the residual demand. It is a consensus that the elasticity 
of demand for electricity is inelastic. Consumers have few, if any, alternative sources of 
energy. The price awareness is also limited in the short run. Consumers cannot monitor the 
price fluctuations, and respond to them from hour to hour. This is expected to change slightly 
in the future when more efficient metering technology is introduced. We can also imagine that 
substitutes for electricity can make an impact in the future. Nevertheless, the demand must be 
characterized as inelastic in the present situation.  
 
The level of flexibility in production technologies is another factor affecting the residual 
demand. As previously noted, there is a wide range of production technologies used in the 
production of electricity.  The flexible production consists of hydro power and condensing 
power stations. The market participants using these forms of production face a more inelastic 
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residual demand as competitors will have trouble responding to a price increase in the short 
run, due to inflexible production.  
The different production technologies are the origin of another feature that plays a role 
concerning the elasticity of the residual demand. The diversity in production causes the 
marginal cost of production to be asymmetric. The producers which have low marginal costs 
can raise prices without competitors being able to respond.  
 
 
 
2.5 Collective Market Power  
 
 
The purpose of the previous sub-section was to discuss whether the market participants with a 
dominant position could exert market power. The focus was on the individual firms. The 
Nordic electricity sector resembles an oligopoly, and therefore the possibility of tacit 
collusion has to be considered. A market with the characteristics of an oligopoly will be more 
likely to induce this kind of collective market power the more evenly the market shares are 
distributed. The reason for this is that the participants in a symmetric market will have similar 
incentives and retaliation power. The possibility for swift responses reduces the incentive to 
deviate from a peaceful equilibrium. The level of transparency is important in order to detect 
deviations quickly. When a market is transparent the players in a market can observe the 
actions of its competitors and can punish any deviations quickly. Therefore the rational 
behavior for all market participants is to maintain a peaceful equilibrium.  
 
The Nordic market for generation of electricity is considered to be relatively transparent. 
Electricity is a homogeneous product, and the price of the product can be monitored on an 
hourly basis on Nord Pool. The bilateral market is some what less transparent, but as 
previously noted, the system price from Nord Pool is often the basis from which these 
contracts are formed. This will reduce the possibility for tacit collusion.  
Another factor which reduces the market player’s ability of exerting collective market power 
is the asymmetric cost structure of the various different production technologies. The 
producers which face higher marginal production costs cannot respond to a price increase by a 
competitor. This factor is only relevant when considering the whole Nordic market, since 
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producers in Norway mainly produce electricity from hydropower. This form of production is 
characterized by low marginal costs.  Hydro power is also flexible, and producers are able to 
react by altering the production quickly.  
Market participants in the Nordic market have opportunities to interact with each other. This 
is a factor which facilitates tacit collusion. Competitors can meet at Nord Pool and coordinate 
their production. The power plants are often jointly owned, and this enhances the companies’ 
ability to exchange information. 
 
There are opportunities to interact, but the structure of the Nordic electricity market does not 
facilitate tacit collusion. The main argument for this view is the asymmetric environment. The 
market actors with competitive advantage, e.g. producers of hydro power, will have incentives 
to deviate from a situation with collective market power. The discussion in the previous sub-
section regarding the environment for exerting individual market power leads to a different 
conclusion. The residual demand for electricity has to be considered inelastic. Therefore, it is 
possible for a producer like Statkraft to exert individual market power. 
 
The conclusion of the preceding analysis is that the Nordic market for generation of electricity 
is highly concentrated, and that the environment to some extent facilitates the exertion of 
market power. The introduction of CO2-quotas will effect the competitive environment in the 
market. Assuming all things remain equal, the findings above will likely cause the burden of 
the quotas to be imposed on consumers. The purpose of next sub-section is to quickly 
summarize and label the results of our findings regarding the competitive environment in the 
electricity sector.  
 
 
2.6 Defining the Competitive Structure of the Market 
 
 
In the first section of this thesis the effects of the introduction of quotas in an ideal world of 
perfect competition were examined. During that discussion, several strict conditions were 
presented, and in that regard, price competition was assumed. This theoretical approach is 
useful, but rarely observable in any market, and certainly not in the Nordic electricity market. 
We have concluded that the market resembles an oligopoly, and also that there are 
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opportunities to exert market power. In addition, a dominant market participant like Statkraft 
enjoys  low marginal costs of production compared to many of its competitors. These factors 
facilitate the use of a model of an oligopoly with price (Bertrand) competition among players 
with asymmetric costs of production. This model is useful in understanding price formation, 
which will be elaborated in the next section. Therefore it will also be the basis for the first part 
of the discussion concerning the price formation. Nevertheless, this is not the most pertinent 
definition of the competitive environment. The decisive factor in this regard is the capacity 
constraints of the production of electricity. The dominant players cannot satisfy the whole 
demand of the market. This means that competitors most of the time are facing residual 
demand. The market participants compete with capacity as the decision variable. Therefore, 
the most accurate description of the competitive structure is an oligopoly with capacity 
(Cournot) competition.  
 
The next section will go into detail concerning the factors which determine the price in the 
power sector. The market for electricity is in constant development and several variables are 
important when trying to understand the mechanisms that set the price for electricity.  
 
 
  3.0 Price-setting Mechanisms  
 
  
The preceding section shed light on the competitive environment. The conclusion was that the 
market is characterized by quantity competition, and has the features of an oligopoly. The 
purpose of this section is to examine the variables that determine the price in the Nordic 
market for generation of electricity. The market has in recent years developed from a closed 
national market, to an integrated Nordic market. In the future, one is expected to observe a 
complete coupling with the market in continental Europe. As a consequence, the Norwegian 
hydropower producers will not set the price in the market. They will have to take the market 
price as exogenously given. Nevertheless, the present situation implies that the production of 
hydropower is often the price setter. How often this is the case is an interesting question when 
trying to determine the effects of the CO2-quotas.  
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In addition to hydro power there are several other variables that have an impact on the price of 
electricity. These variables will also be studied thoroughly in this section. The most relevant 
factor is perhaps the marginal cost of production for coal-based electricity production. Studies 
have shown that this marginal cost sets the price under normal circumstances. By normal 
circumstances one means that the hydrologic balance is average, and that nuclear production 
is at a normal level. As the electricity market has become more integrated, the cost of the 
marginal production technology determines the price for electricity. As mentioned above, this 
is often coal-based production. This entails that the oil price becomes a factor when studying 
the price formation in the market for generation of electricity. The price of coal has a positive 
correlation with the price of oil. That is also the case for the price of gas. During hours of 
peak demand, more expensive production forms are needed to cover the demand in the 
market. This will lead to higher prices. In order to clarify these factors the following sub-
section will examine the electricity prices in the Nordic market in the second half of 2007. 
This will hopefully make it easier to understand the mechanisms that determine price 
formation. The focus of the section will then switch to the external factors which are 
becoming more important due to the continuous integration of the electricity sector. 
 
 
 
3.1 Historic Prices; 2007 and Hydro-power’s Role as Price Setter 
 
 
The second half of the preceding year, 2007, is an interesting sample in order to understand 
the dynamics of the electricity price. In Norway, the summer of 2007 was characterized by a 
great deal of precipitation. It was estimated to be almost 200% above what is considered to be 
a normal year. The hydro power producers went into this period with a surplus of 9 Twh in 
the hydrologic balance. The hydrologic balance refers to the storage of water in the reservoirs. 
This surplus at the start of the summer combined with the unusually wet summer, lead to 
pressure on production. This implies that the producers of hydro-power have to increase 
production in order to avoid water literally spilling over. The electricity produced exceeded 
the export capacity in the transmission grid from the Norwegian areas, and we could therefore 
observe record low prices at this time. The prices in the Norwegian price areas were  
significantly lower than the rest of the Nordic region. The system price was naturally located 
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between the low-price area of southern Norway, and the higher price in the rest of the Nordic 
area.  
 
Figure 3.1: Electricity prices 
NO1 and System Price -Weekly 2007-01/2008-09
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Source: Nordpool.com  
 
 
 
The final quarter of 2007 showed an increase in the system price. This reversal of the 
tendency towards record low prices in the summer illustrates a distinctive characteristic of the 
Nordic market for generation of electricity, namely the water value. This term refers to the 
fact that water has an alternative cost in producing one unit of electricity today. When a 
producer of hydropower lets water flow through the turbines, they can not utilize the water 
again. On the other hand, saving too much water means they run the risk of letting valuable 
water spill out of the reservoirs. Hence, the producers of hydro-power face a rather complex 
optimizing problem.  
 
In the fall of 2007, the Norwegian producers approached this problem by withholding 
production in anticipation of higher prices in the first quarter of 2008. The beginning of 2008 
marked the beginning of the second period of ETS. This second stage of the quota-system was 
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expected to lead to higher values for the quotas, and a corresponding higher price of 
electricity. Producing electricity is also considered to be more beneficial in the winter due to 
winter climate, with colder weather and snow instead of rain. As a result of hydro power 
producers’ reduction in production, one could observe that the system price converged 
towards early 2008-prices at the end of the year. The figure above shows that both the system 
price and the area price for southern Norway declines during the first weeks of 2008. This 
tendency has also continued after week nine. Data from Nord Pool reveals that the reduction 
in the price for NO1 is larger than the system price after week nine. This observation indicates 
that the production of hydro-power can offer an explanation. The following figure can 
possibly shed some light on this matter:  
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Figure 3.2, Source: Fjordkraft
7
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows unusually high levels of precipitation during the first part of 2008. The 
hydrological balance, which will be explained below, is positive when entering this period. 
These two factors combined lead to a situation comparable to the summer of 2007. Producers 
of hydro power face pressure on production, and an increase in production reduces prices. I 
have not found data concerning the transmission capacity for this period of time. 
Nevertheless, an educated guess is that the price for southern Norway follows the system 
price until the export capacity from NO1 is reached.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Meeting with John Brottemsmo, senior analyst Fjordkraft 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51
normal precipitation: blue line
 
2008-precipitation: pink line 
 36 
The two latter paragraphs show that hydro-power is important in regard to price formation in 
the Nordic electricity market. It is widely acknowledged that the direct marginal cost of 
production for hydro power is close to zero, but the water value is added to this marginal cost 
as an alternative cost. The physical characteristics of water as production input is also a factor 
which contributes to making hydro-power a price setter. The capacity limits of the 
transmission grid is also worth noting, as hydro-power only contributes to a fraction of the 
electricity production in the Nordic region as a whole. Without a congested transmission grid, 
the variation in hydro-power production would not affect the electricity price as much. The 
production of hydro-power has the greatest impact on price formation under “abnormal” 
circumstances, or in other words, when the hydrologic balance is upset. A significant surplus 
in the reservoirs and snow reserves leads to pressure on production and corresponding low 
prices. If there is a deficit, one is dependent on import of electricity from surrounding areas. 
In this case one will observe higher prices due to lack of production of hydropower. 
Fjordkraft has quantified the interval of hydrologic balance to be within 10 TWh deficit or 
surplus.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Hydrological balance 
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This plot of the hydrologic balance from 2004 until today clearly shows that the state of 
hydrologic balance, using Fjordkraft’s estimate, is not to be taken for granted. It seems that 
during this time period, the market is frequently in a state of imbalance. In light of the 
discussion above, this would underline hydro-power’s role as a price setter in the market.  
 
When the market is in the state of hydrologic balance, other variables have a greater impact 
on the price formation in the Nordic market for generation of electricity. The next sub-section 
will examine these other factors. 
 
 
3.2 Price Formation in an Integrated Nordic Electricity Market 
 
 
The previous sub-section showed the relevance of hydro power in regard to the price 
formation in the electricity sector. This result is somewhat surprising, since production of 
hydro power is characterized by low marginal costs. In section two the competitive 
environment of the industry was debated. The conclusion was that the environment resembled 
that of an oligopoly. However, the traditional way of viewing the competition and the price 
formation in the Nordic electricity market is Bertrand competition with asymmetric marginal 
costs. For the time being, it is useful to use the assumption of price competition with 
asymmetrical marginal costs in our analysis: 
 
The equilibrium in the case of price competition with asymmetrical marginal costs of 
production follows directly from the discussion of the Bertrand paradox, which is thoroughly 
presented in the introductory section. Assuming two firms competing, the firm with lowest 
marginal costs will charge a price marginally below its competitor’s price. The firm with the 
competitive advantage will obtain a profit equal to the difference between the marginal costs: 
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This model is useful for explaining the observed characteristics of the electricity market. The 
supply and demand curve has distinctive features, and is a useful tool in order to predict and 
explain the development of the electricity price in the Nordic region. This approach to the 
problem is widely accepted among market participants when analyzing the market. The 
supply and demand curve will be presented below. In this regard it is important to remember 
that the role of hydro power as price setter during certain hours slightly distorts the picture.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Market cross, theoretical 
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The figure shows the distinctive features of the supply and demand curve. The production of 
electricity includes several different production technologies. Each of these has different 
marginal costs of production. This leads to the “ladder-shaped” supply curve which shifts 
upwards at the threshold for each production technology. This mechanism continues with a 
corresponding higher price until the demand has been satisfied. The outer part of the supply 
curve is steep and in hours of peak demand one can observe large jumps in the electricity 
price. During these hours peak power generators are used, which generally involves very high 
production costs.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Market cross, empirical 
Source: Nordpool.com 2.4.2008 
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Figure 3.5 shows the market cross for the Nordic electricity market as it is observed on Nord 
Pool on the second of April 2008. Nord Pool defines the system price based on the aggregated 
supply and demand in the market. Market participants report to the exchange both volumes 
and at which price they are interested in buying or selling. Nord Pool then matches these and 
the market obtains the system price. These data are published with a one day delay. (This is 
why the system operators (TSO`s) sometimes have to perform countertrade in order to make 
sure the volumes of trade from Nord Pool are fulfilled.) 
 
The empirical supply and demand curve which is presented in the figure does not at first sight 
correspond with the theoretical curve presented above. There are several reasons that cause 
this deviation. Firstly, the empirical figure shows a snapshot of a small interval around the 
market cross of the aggregated supply and demand curve. This will distort the impression of 
the supply curve, and neither the ladder shaped structure nor the steepness for higher volumes 
will be observable. Secondly, the market cross on the second of April this year showed a 
system price of roughly 28 EUR/MWh. This price is relatively low and places us well to the 
left in the theoretical supply and demand diagram. In other words, at this price level the more 
expensive production technologies placed at the outer rim of the diagram are not relevant. 
Thus, the steepness of this part of the supply curve does not clearly materialize in the figure 
from Nord pool.  
 
The supply curve is, as we can see, somewhat complex and has several interesting features. 
The demand curve is perhaps more straight-forward. The demand side was thoroughly 
examined in the previous section. The empirical figure from Nord Pool confirms the results 
from this discussion. The demand for electricity was earlier described as relatively inelastic 
because of lack of substitutes and lack of transparency in the market. Consumers do not have 
any alternative sources of energy at present, and they cannot monitor the price from hour to 
hour. The inelasticity of demand gives us the steep demand curve, which can be observed in 
the figure above.  
 
The steep demand curve underlines the importance of the various different production 
technologies for the price formation in the Nordic market for electricity.  
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The more expensive production technologies are often characterized by a low level of 
flexibility. The flexibility of production is a key to understanding the mechanisms that affect 
the price today, and will be even more important in the future. The German market for 
electricity differs significantly from the Nordic market, partly because of lack of flexibility. 
The demand in the German market is to a great extent supplied by electricity produced from 
coal. Power generators based on coal cannot be switched off in response to change in demand. 
It is too costly to stop and restart these generators. As a result, the German prices are high 
during day-time, and correspondingly low during nights. The following figure illustrates this. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: German and Nordic electricity prices 
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Figure 3.6 shows the Nordic system price and the price from the German El-spot area 
(KONTEK). In line with the reasoning in the previous paragraph, the German price fluctuates 
more during the 24-hour orbit than the Nordic price. It is interesting to note that the German 
price is constantly higher than the system price. This means that the German price area is net 
importer from the Nordic region throughout the day. This particular result obtained on the 
first of April 2008, is dangerous to generalize.  A recurrent scenario is that the Nordic region 
is net importer at night, while net exporter in daytime.  
 
The figure above is an interesting comparison of the two different electricity markets. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from a plot of the prices on one 
random day. Nevertheless, it illustrates some important aspects regarding the price formation 
in the Nordic market. The significant volatility of the German price during the different hours 
of the day underlines the value of the flexibility that the producers of hydro-power have. At 
present, the value of this flexibility is somewhat limited due to the capacity constraints on the 
transmission grid. In the future this is expected to change. With future transmission capacity 
which is not limited by congestion between the Nordic region and the KONTEK-area, the 
prices will converge. It is difficult to accurately quantify the effects this will have on the 
Nordic electricity price, but the accepted view is that it will lead to a higher price. The Nordic 
producers will naturally benefit from a higher price, and this development will be enhanced 
by the increased ability to optimize production in hours of higher prices.  
 
  
3.2.1 Further Integration of the Nordic Market in Near Future 
 
 
 
The last paragraph concluded with the claim of an improved future transmission capacity 
between the Nordic countries, as well as between the Nordic region and continental Europe. 
This suggestion has important implications and will be addressed here. Furthermore, on the 
basis of the figure of the German and Nordic electricity prices, the last sub-section revealed 
that the effects will result in higher electricity prices in the Nordic region. The capacity 
constraints are one of the main factors that limit the competition in the market. The Nordic 
competition authorities welcome the expansion of the transmission grid in order to enlarge the 
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market. The authorities claim that this will enforce competition. It seems like a paradox that a 
scenario which will imply higher prices is optimal from a competition point of view. It is not 
necessarily the aim of this thesis to perform a thorough welfare analysis. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to obtain an overview of the plans for developing the transmission grid in order to 
examine the effects on the future price of electricity.  
   
The process of expanding the grid has accelerated during recent years. Today, the export and 
import capacity from the Nordic region to surrounding areas are respectively 3650 and 5530 
MW
8
. Roughly 50 percent of these capacities originate from links established within the last 
nine years: 
 
 
 
2000: SwePol, 600MV 
2003: Finland-Russia, +450MW 
2006: Estlink, 350MW 
2007: DK1-Germany, +300/+150 MW 
2008: NorNed, 700 MW 
 
 
There has been a dramatic increase in transmission capacity in recent years. This trend is 
expected to continue. A further 3500 MW of capacity is anticipated to be added to the 
transmission grid within 2015
9
. The development indicates that the convergence of the Nordic 
and continental European prices is going to be a reality soon.  
 
As noted above, this is expected to raise the Nordic prices. The rationale behind this reasoning 
is simple. The marginal cost of production is higher for thermal production of electricity. This 
production technology is dominant in central Europe. In dry years one can at present observe 
Nordic prices that are higher than German prices. This is mainly due to the constraints on 
import capacity to the Nordic region. It is important to note that this scenario is the exception 
that confirms the rule. The Nordic prices are generally lower, and it is therefore legitimate to 
conclude that convergence will lead to higher prices in the Nordic region. This future 
                                                 
8
 Conversation with John Brottemsmo, senior analyst, Fjordkraft 
9
 NORDEL (the organization for Nordic TSO’s), 2008,  www.nordel.org 
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development is welcomed by the Nordic producers. The Norwegian producers of hydro power 
should be especially pleased. They are able to adjust production on an hourly basis in order to 
optimize the value of production. This is valuable today, but will be even more profitable 
when the producers will have unrestricted access to the continental market in the near future. 
Increased profit will be obtained by exploiting the differences in prices during a daily 24-hour 
orbit. (See figure of German daily prices above) 
 
This particular result is of great interest for the purpose of this thesis. The fact that the Nordic 
price is expected to coincide with European prices will make it easier to establish the effect of 
the quotas on Nordic prices. The added cost of CO2 will have a direct effect on the electricity 
produced from thermal power which is dominant in continental Europe. And with converging 
prices, this direct effect will also apply to the Nordic prices. The next section will make use of 
this result in order to examine the price effects of the quotas. The rest of this section will 
discuss other variables which influence the price formation in the market.  
 
 
3.3 Other Price Factors 
 
 
The preceding parts of this thesis discussed hydropower’s role as price setter, as well as the 
importance of coal-based production in periods of hydrological imbalance. Furthermore, the 
importance of the continuing integration of the Nordic market for generation of electricity was 
underlined. This sub-section will focus on other variables that also have a significant impact 
on the price formation in the market. We have earlier mentioned that a financial market with 
electricity as the traded commodity is fully developed. In recent, years hedge funds as well as 
other investors have discovered the possibility to take positions in electricity products in order 
to diversify their portfolios. Raw material is often negatively correlated with the financial 
markets. These markets are thus valuable when investors are trying to reduce risk. The effects 
of the financial market concerning electricity are becoming increasingly important, but will 
not be further elaborated in this thesis. The focus will be on oil prices, in addition to coal and 
gas prices. The goal of this part of the work is to examine the mechanisms that shape the price 
of these commodities, now and in the future. This will be important when the next section 
discusses the price effects of CO2-quotas.  
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3.3.1 Oil Price 
 
The price of oil is a parameter which is considered important in many aspects of the economic 
world. Many countries rely on oil, and an increase in the oil price often has dramatic effects. 
It is somewhat difficult to obtain full insight regarding this market, and one encounters even 
more problems when trying to forecast future development of the oil price.  
 
Supply of oil comes from countries which are blessed with oil reserves. Examples are 
Norway, Canada and the Arabic nations. There is a great level of demand uncertainty since a 
large part of the oil supply origin from politically unstable areas. A few of the suppliers are 
also engaged in, or on the brink of, war activities. These factors push the spot-price of oil 
upwards since it is an advantage to hold oil, instead of buying forward. The demand for oil is 
to some extent dependent on the general activity of the world economy. In recent years the 
demand for oil has increased, especially from the emerging economies in Asia. The last factor 
mentioned here is the US dollar. The price of oil is named in US $.  The last year has been 
turbulent for the American currency. The dollar was traded for roughly 6.20 NOK in early 
2007, and on the 12 of April 2008 it was traded below 5.00 NOK for the first time in about 20 
years. The depreciating dollar reduces the oil price in real terms.   
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Figure 3.7: Oil Prices      Source: International Energy Agency, March 2008
10
 
 
 
The recent period has brought record-high oil prices. The magic boundary of 100 US$/barrel 
was broken in early 2008.  The growth in the global economy is expected to slow down in the 
near future. The financial markets are currently in deep turmoil. This is a factor which 
indicates a lower oil price. Nevertheless, the demand for oil is relatively inelastic and the 
unstable Middle-East region is not likely to improve in the near future. However, it is beyond 
the limits of this thesis to provide a meaningful forecast of the future oil price.  
 
                                                 
10
 http://mailing.iea.org/        
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3.3.2 Coal Price 
 
The price of oil does not affect the electricity price directly. However, the oil price influences 
other variables, which in turn have a great impact on the price of electricity in the Nordic 
countries. The price of coal offers an example. As mentioned above, the marginal cost of 
production of coal is decisive for the electricity price in the Nordic region. The marginal cost 
can roughly be divided into the price of the raw material, the coal, and the price of a CO2-
quota. This underlines the importance of a discussion concerning the price of coal. The latter 
part of 2007 showed an increase of the coal price of roughly 50 percent, from 80 US$/ton to 
120 US$/ton. The increase in price for coal delivered to Europe is caused by both increased 
transportation costs and a rise in price of coal sold from exporters. Coal used in European 
electricity production originates mainly from South Africa. The transportation costs increased 
first during the fall of 2007. Coal is transported by means of dry-bulk. This implies that coal is 
transported on big ships, and competes with respect to price with other raw material such as 
iron, in addition to grain. The rise in transportation costs came because of reduced port 
capacity in South Africa. Furthermore, the economic growth in China led to an increased 
import of iron. A final factor influencing the transportation costs for coal during the fall of 
2007 was that Australia was forced to import grain because of a failed harvest.  
After the increase in freight charges, the price of coal delivered Europe was pushed further 
upwards due to the fact that the price of the raw material itself increased: 
 
 
 
 48 
 
Figure 3.8: Coal Prices,  Source: Coal Trader International, Jan 18. 2008
11
  
 
 
 The price of coal delivered from exporting nations is determined by the conditions of supply 
and demand. These mechanisms are rather complex and difficult to predict. The freight 
charges are somewhat easier to grasp. The financial market, by the means of forward prices, is 
expecting a lower price of coal delivered Europe the next three years (see figure below). 
Capacity of dry-bulk will increase, since 500 new ships are expected to be built within the 
next few years. The port capacity in South Africa will also be improved. These factors 
indicate a lower price of coal delivered Europe, but the freight charges are closely tied to the 
oil price: 
 
                                                 
11
 
http://www.platts.com/Coal/Newsletters%20&%20Reports/Coal%20Trader%20International/See%20A%20Sam
ple/index.pdf?o=v 
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Figure 3.9: Forward prices, coal   Source: Coal Trader International, Jan 18. 2008 
 
 
 
   
Figure 3.10: Correlation of oil and freight charges   Source: John Brottemsmo, Fjordkraft 
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The financial markets expect a lower price in the next few years. This is possible to explain 
by the means of reasonable arguments concerning the expected development in dry-bulk in 
the near future. Nevertheless, the figure indicates that the uncertain oil price to some extent 
dictates the future price of dry-bulk transportation. The first part of 2008 has brought record-
high coal prices. The background for this is the simultaneous effects of supply trouble and a 
large demand for coal.  
 
  
3.3.3 Natural Gas Prices 
 
 
The price of natural gas is an interesting aspect of the future development of the energy 
market. Generation of electricity from natural gas is not competitive compared to coal 
production. The marginal cost of production of electricity from natural gas is roughly 75 
EUR/MWh.  Hence, the production of electricity with this technology is rarely profitable with 
the prices we at present are observing in the market. This could change in the future when the 
quota-regime is fully developed. Furthermore, the structure of the market for natural gas is 
evolving. As previously mentioned, it is a goal for this thesis to explore whether natural gas 
can obtain competitiveness compared to coal-based production. There seems to be a need for 
a radical change in order for this to happen. The marginal cost of production of coal is about 
35 EUR/MWh, which is about half of the marginal production costs for natural gas.  
 
The market for natural gas is structured mainly in the form of long-term contracts. The British 
market is an exception, where the market resembles the Nordic spot market for electricity. 
The prices of the long-term contracts are generally far above the prices in the British spot 
market. The reason for this is that the contracts are tied to the oil price. This seems counter-
intuitive. One would expect that producers of natural gas, which often also produce oil, would 
like to hedge oil price-risk by means of selling natural gas. This reasoning would also apply to 
oil-importing nations. One would assume that buying natural gas could be an alternative in 
periods of soaring oil prices. Natural gas could then represent a gain in the form of 
diversification for both oil- exporting and importing countries.  The rationale behind tying the 
contracts to the oil price is to guarantee the profitability of extracting the natural gas 
resources. Trading of natural gas implies investments in infrastructure in the form of 
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pipelines. (Natural gas is also transported in liquid form in ships.) Producers will therefore 
demand a guarantee of profitability in the form of contracts tied to the oil price, before they 
decide to extract the natural gas resources from oil fields. The market for natural gas has also 
been relatively unstable due to delivery uncertainty. Russia has a significant part of the 
world’s natural gas resources. Importers of natural gas have been reluctant to make 
themselves completely dependent on Russian gas, as the Russian political environment has 
been perceived as unstable. Several countries have in fact accurately quantified the maximum 
proportion of import coming from Russia. The consequence of this is that countries will 
purchase natural gas from more expensive sources in order to get a more reliable supply.   
 
The long-term contracts tied to the oil price are the main reason why the price of natural gas 
has followed the upward trend of other natural resources. This can change in the future. When 
the long term contracts expire, we develop a spot-based market, like the one which is already 
developed in Great Britain. There is also a great deal of delivery uncertainty today since many 
countries are semi-dependent on natural gas from Russia.  
 
 
4.0 The Introduction of CO2-quotas 
 
 
The development of the European trading scheme (ETS) is the EU’s response to the Koyoto 
agreement. The Koyoto-agreement has its background in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was signed by 154 countries in 1992 with 
the goal of stabilizing the emissions of climate gases. In 1997, the UNFCCC was elaborated 
with the signing of the Koyoto-protocol, when several industrialized countries committed 
themselves to reduce emissions below 1990-level. The EU has to reduce the emission of 
climate gases by 7% compared to the 1990 emission. Russia signed the agreement in 2004, 
and thereby the conditions for the protocol to become effective were fulfilled.  
 
As mentioned above, the introduction of the ETS came as a direct consequence of the 
requirements imposed on the European Union by the Koyoto-protocol. Economists have long 
been convinced that market intervention in the form of quotas is the right way to approach an 
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environmental problem like the one we are faced with now. An individual actor does not have 
the incentive to cut its emissions. Hence, market intervention is necessary in order to achieve 
reduction of emissions. Problems arise when trying to determine the effective way to 
intervene. Individual restrictions without opportunities to trade will not achieve cost effective 
reduction. The rationale behind a quota-based system is that market forces will lead to a cost 
effective reduction of the emissions of climate gases. In other words, market participants with 
superior cleaning technology will sell quotas in the market at a price above the marginal 
cleaning cost. Conversely, an actor with high cleaning costs will choose to purchase quotas in 
the market at a price below its marginal cleaning cost. This process will continue until an 
equilibrium is reached where the market price of the quotas is equal to the marginal cleaning 
cost of all market participants.  
 
This rationale behind the quota-system will be presented more formally later in this section. 
As noted, economists generally agree on this subject. Nevertheless, many non-economists 
need convincing before they accept that a market-based tool is the right way to approach this 
environmental problem. The ETS is a pioneer project that is being closely monitored by 
academics and public officials around the world. The experiences with the ETS will be very 
important regarding the future of such a market-based weapon against climate changes. USA 
was one of the strongest supporters of a quota-system in the early stages, since it has had 
positive past experiences with market based reduction of sulfur. By contrast, the European 
Union was at first skeptical towards the idea of a quota system in order to reduce emissions. 
The conditions changed drastically however, when the US refused to accept the terms of the 
Koyoto-protocol. USA’s withdrawal from the negotiations was a massive blow. The world’s 
richest country is also the largest contributor to emissions of greenhouse-gases. The parties 
are painfully aware that an effective reduction in emissions requires a global commitment. 
This is where the ETS will play an important role. If the trading of allowances turns out to be 
a success, the rest of the world will probably be more inclined to enter into similar projects. 
The European Union has an advantage in coordinating a multi-national agreement like the 
ETS. The European Commision (EC) represents a strong central authority with the means to 
impose sanctions on countries that do not comply. One of the main challenges when 
implementing a multi-national regime like the ETS, is that the individual countries have no 
incentives to obey the rules set by a coalition of countries.  
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 The next sub-sections will present the experiences to this date concerning the quota-system, 
as well as the future outlooks. In addition, the formal model of the quota-system will be 
presented. In the introduction of this thesis it was claimed that the quotas can be interpreted as 
an imposed tax. We will therefore, in light of the results in the preceding sections, also 
elaborate on the imposed tax-model.  
 
 
 
 
4.1 The ETS; 2005-2007 
 
 
The first period of the trading scheme started in 2005 and was finished by the end of 2007. 
These three years were designed as a trial period in order for market participants to get 
familiar with the market, in addition to the establishing of market infrastructure. One of the 
challenges in the first period of the system was the uncertainty regarding the future prospects 
for market participants. The member countries were all aware that the allowances for this 
period solely had the purpose of establishing the framework for an arena of emissions trading.  
The allowances were allocated to market participants based on historic emissions levels. The 
reductions imposed were relatively mild, and experts predicted early that the price of the 
quotas would be close to zero. The reason for this assumption was simply that the restrictions 
imposed on the 25 original EU member countries were too conservative. Naturally, the value 
of the quotas will to a great extent depend on the scarcity of allowances. The allocation of 
allowances, known as the National Allocation Plans (NAP) will decide the scarcity. First we 
will look at the development of the price of the quotas during the first period of the ETS. The 
end of the period proved the experts right, in that price of quotas was zero. Nevertheless, the 
price during the trial period was often high. This was especially the case at the start of the 
three-year period: 
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Figure 4.1: Quota prices       Source: European Climate Exchange (ECX) 
 
 
 
The figure above shows a market distinguished by a high level of volatility. The contracts in 
question are future contracts with settlement in December 2007. As mentioned above, the first 
half of the trial period was characterized by surprisingly high prices. There are several factors 
which influence the value of the allowances. It is quite intuitive that the potential and costs for 
reducing emission affects the quota-prices, but the new market also responds to fossil fuel 
prices as well as temperature and precipitation. The volatility also underlines the importance 
of a stable political foundation.  
 
The price of the quotas will co-vary with the price of oil and natural gas. The reason for this is 
that higher prices for liquid fossil fuels will lead to a shift in the raw material for electricity 
production, from oil and natural gas to coal. The emission level of coal-based electricity 
production is twice that of natural gas. This will naturally drive up the demand for CO2-
quotas, and hence lead to a higher price. The above paragraph also argued that the value of 
allowances is dependent on temperature and precipitation. This mainly has its background in 
the structure of the Nordic electricity market, which under normal conditions is partly 
supplied by hydro-power. In dry years the production of hydro power is reduced. The demand 
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for fossil fuels increases in order to cover the demand for electricity, and thereby also the 
demand for allowances. The last factor influencing the price of the quotas is the political 
regulatory framework. The market for trading in quotas is new. In order to establish a 
functioning market, the information available to market participants must be as complete as 
possible. The volatility in the first period of the ETS can partly be explained by the quality, or 
lack of, available information. Market participants faced many uncertain variables. Firstly, the 
allocation of allowances was only for the first period. Everyone was aware that the allocation 
would be reduced in the period after the trial period, and that scarcity would be increased in 
the future. This factor gave incentive to purchase allowances for later use. To some extent, 
this helps explain the high price of allowances in the early stages of the three-year period. 
Secondly, the level of verified emissions was difficult to predict. The figure above shows a 
sharp decline in the price in May 2006. This dramatic price reduction came as a result of the 
release of verified emission data for 2005. The announcement was unexpected, and several 
member countries simultaneously reported lower emissions than experts had forecasted.  
 
This sharp and unexpected decline brought voices of concern regarding the high level of 
volatility. It seems that the market for trading in allowances strongly needs reliable sources of 
information before a stable investment environment can be finalized. The latter part of the 
trial period showed declining prices that approached zero. This was, as noted above, more in 
line with the predictions of analysts. The volatility seemed to decline towards the end of the 
three-year introduction phase, and this is possibly a positive indication for the future of the 
ETS. The second part of the agreement began at the start of 2008. The next sub-section will 
study the development in the early stages of the Koyoto-period, which will end in 2012.  
 
 
 4.1.2 ETS; The Koyoto-period 2008-2012 
 
 
The second part of the ETS is called the Koyoto-period. The name reflects that the goal of this 
phase is for member countries to achieve the reduction of emissions, as outlined in the 
Koyoto-protocol. In order for this to be a success, the allocation of allowances has to be more 
restrictive than was the case in the first period. In other words, the scarcity of the quotas 
should increase. If this was the case, one would expect to observe an increased price of the 
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allowances. We are now only a few months into the second phase of the ETS, and it is 
naturally too early to draw any conclusions regarding the success of the Koyoto-period. 
Nevertheless, there are already interesting data available that give an indication of the 
development: 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Forward contracts, price and volume   Source: ECX 
 
 
The contracts in question here are future contracts with settlement in December 2008. The 
data reflect trading in these contracts from the start of the ETS, up until April 2008. April of 
this year gives the latest data available. The discussion of the trial period reveals a volatile 
market. The figure above indicates a reduction in the volatility for the second phase of the 
trading scheme. Even if it too early to draw conclusions, the tendency of reduced price 
fluctuations offer positive signs for future prospects of the arrangement. The volatility of the 
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December-08 contracts was already relatively stable with respect to price during the trial 
period. Furthermore, the figure indicates that the price of the contracts has reached an even 
higher level of stability in the first quarter of 2008. The price for an allowance of one metric 
ton of CO2 settled in December 2008 is expected to be around 20-25 Euro. This stable 
tendency would indicate that investors are satisfied with the transparency of the market, as 
well as the general stability of the conditions in the investment environment. If this is the 
case, we will probably observe an increase in traded volume. The data from the above figure 
confirm this. The total volume traded in these contracts has increased steadily from the start 
of the period, which is natural for a market in the starting phase. More importantly, the 
volume growth accelerated at the end of the trial period. This tendency continued into the 
early stages of the Koyoto-period.  The increased volume is a strong signal from the market 
participants that the ETS has succeeded in establishing an apparently well functioning market 
for trading in quotas. The strictly positive and stable price of the allowances indicates that the 
allocation of the allowances has reached its objective, namely to create a scarcity that in turn 
assigns a significant value to the quotas. In order to further examine the proposal that the 
quotas are priced within the interval of 20-25 euro pr metric ton, it is interesting to study the 
price of futures with different settlement dates. If the stable characteristics from the 
December-08 contracts can be generalized to the longer contracts, it would substantiate the 
assumption of a well-functioning market. The following figure presents the various different 
contract types in the same diagram:  
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Figure 4.3: Forward contracts      Source: ECX 
 
 
The diagram indicates somewhat surprising results. The allowances are valued at the same 
price regardless of the settlement date. The reason for this is that the Koyoto-commitments are 
based on average emission levels for the four-year period from 2008-2012. In addition, 
investors have chosen to purchase the contracts with the nearest settlement date (December 
2008). Nearly the whole total volume of trading has been in 2008-contracts.  We have to 
question the reliability of these data and be careful not to define the price from the figure 
above as an absolute truth, only a few months into the second phase of the ETS.  
 
 
 
4.2 Coal versus Natural Gas-based Production of Electricity 
 
 
The above discussion gives hold to interesting results for the purpose of this thesis. The object 
of the work is to predict how the introduction of quotas will influence the price and 
production in the Nordic electricity market. It is therefore quite useful to discover these 
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structural aspects of the newly emerged market of quotas. The volatility is reduced and there 
seems to be a consensus of the value of the allowances. This will make it possible to discuss 
the implications for the price of electricity. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the value of the 
quotas will be added to the marginal cost of production for coal-based production of 
electricity. Economic theory suggests that a quota based system will lead to cost effective 
reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases. Market participants with low marginal cleaning 
costs will sell quotas and actors with higher costs will purchase quotas. This process will 
continue until the marginal cost of cleaning is equal to the market price of the quotas for all 
players. The theory concerning quotas does not include the factor of different production 
technologies. In order to include this distinctive feature of the electricity market in the 
discussion, an example will be presented in the next paragraph. 
 
In the electricity market, one can view the marginal cleaning cost as a switching cost.    
In order to illustrate this, we can assume a producer of electricity with a coal based 
production.  This producer now faces an externally imposed production cost equal to the value 
of a CO2-quota. This is to be considered a cost even if the allowances are allocated to the 
producer free of charge. The reason for this is that the opportunity cost of the quota is to sell it 
in the market. For the purpose of this example we will assume that the producer has access to 
the technology needed to produce electricity from natural gas, in addition to coal. 
Furthermore, there are no costs involved when changing between the two different production 
technologies. The last assumption is that the marginal cost of production consists only of the 
price of raw material and the value of an allowance, in other words, the efficiency of the two 
fossil fuels is assumed to be equal.   
 
The producer will then optimize its production under the new market conditions. The carbon 
intensity of electricity production from coal is roughly twice that of natural gas based 
production. The producer will reduce the part of the marginal cost of production originating 
from emission by around 50% of the value of the quotas by choosing natural gas as its 
production input. When following the reasoning in this simplified example, the ratio of the 
difference in price of raw material to the quota price will decide which production technology 
the producer will choose. The idea of considering the marginal cleaning cost as a switching 
cost originates from the fact that a coal based producer will purchase quotas as long as this is 
more profitable than switching to natural gas. This assumption does not take into 
consideration the rigidity of the electricity production. Nevertheless, the reasoning might be 
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valuable when considering long-term development.  If one can obtain a significant switch in 
production from coal to natural gas, the level of emission would be reduced. The figure below 
illustrates the mechanisms: 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4:  Marginal cost of production for coal and natural gas-based production 
 
 
 
The figure represents the marginal cost of production of electricity from coal and gas. The red 
line is for coal, while the blue line is for production based on natural gas. In the example from 
the above paragraph it was assumed that the marginal production cost solely consists of the 
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price of raw material in addition to the marginal cost involved with the emissions of climate 
gases (the market price of quotas). These two dimensions can be identified in the figure. The 
intersection of the cost curves with the y-axis shows the marginal cost of production when the 
quota price is zero. Thereby, the price of the raw material is given by the intersection of the 
curves with the y-axis. Natural gas is, at present, roughly twice as expensive as coal. The 
slope of the curves is given by the carbon intensity of the two production technologies. As 
claimed above, the carbon intensity is greater for coal. Hence, the slope of the marginal cost 
as a function of the quota price is steeper for coal than for natural gas. P* represents the 
threshold level for the quota price where the hypothetical producer will be indifferent to using 
coal or natural gas as production input. When the value of the quotas is above P* natural gas 
will be the preferred production input, while coal will be more competitive with a lower quota 
price.   
 
 
The notion of production switching from coal to natural gas is intriguing and its success will, 
as noted above, depend largely on the price of the various different fossil fuels. The previous 
section discussed the past and future development of the oil, coal and natural gas prices. At 
present, the record high prices of raw material indicate that a switch to natural gas is not 
happening in the near future. The marginal cost of production for coal-based electricity 
generation is estimated to be around 35 Euro/MWh, while it is roughly 75 Euro/MWh for 
natural gas. The value of the quotas is at present between 20-25 Euro/ton. One of the 
conclusions from the preceding section is that it is difficult or impossible to predict the future 
price of the fossil fuels. Nevertheless, there are indications that the structural aspects of the 
natural gas market are about to change. The infrastructure is constantly improving, and one 
might see the end of the long term contracts which have dominated this market in the past. 
This kind of evolvement is a necessity in order for natural gas to obtain competitiveness 
compared to coal. The situation today is that the price of both these natural resources is 
closely linked to the oil price. They therefore have a great deal of co-variation. It is difficult to 
imagine that co-variation will be reduced in the immediate future. Nevertheless, the soaring 
prices of raw material in recent years have illustrated the high volatility of these markets. The 
quota-prices after the Koyoto-period will also affect the competitiveness of natural gas.  
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4.3 A Formal Model of Quotas 
 
 
Economists world-wide have embraced the idea of a quota-based approach to the reduction of 
emissions of climate gases. As mentioned above, the assumption is that market mechanisms 
will lead to a cost-effective reduction, and thereby maximize the potential for reduction. This 
thesis is written based on the view that the introduction of quotas is a constructive way to 
approach the climate challenge. In order to illustrate this view, a formal model of the quotas is 
presented below: 
 
Figure 4.5: Formal model of quotas 
 
Source: Kåre P. Hagen, Økonomisk politikk og samfunnsøkonomisk lønnsomhet , 
figur 7, side 247.   
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The figure above illustrates why the notion of quotas has become so popular among 
economists. The main challenge the authorities face when trying to implement quotas, is that 
it is difficult or impossible to detect the cleaning costs for market participants. In addition, 
market players do not have an incentive to reveal the magnitude of these costs. Therefore, a 
random distribution of allowances would not lead to the optimal solution. If the allocation of 
quotas was at P
0
 in the figure, in other words evenly distributed between A and B, one would 
obtain a deadweight loss equal to the triangle made by α, β, γ. The reason for the 
ineffectiveness of the allocation is the difference in marginal cleaning cost. From the above 
figure we see that A has a significantly lower marginal cleaning cost than B. This problem is 
easily solved by making the allowances open for trade in the market. Because of the 
asymmetric marginal cost of cleaning, B will purchase quotas from A. This will continue until 
the equilibrium in P
*
 is reached. A will choose to sell these allowances since it can obtain a 
price in the market which is higher than its marginal cost of cleaning. The equilibrium shows 
that A will, at a lower cost, reduce its emissions significantly more than B. The price of the 
quotas is given by the horizontal line which ends at δ. This price is equal to the marginal cost 
of cleaning for all market participants. It is worth noting that this model assumes that there are 
no market players with the ability to influence the market price. In addition, the emissions 
levels have to be observable. The central authority behind the system has to be able to monitor 
the compliance of the market participants for the threat of sanctions to be feasible. 
 
The model discussed above shows the fundamental economic principles behind a quota based 
system in an elegant way. It can be applied to fishing quotas, as well as emission of climate 
gases. The electricity market is complex with respect to the fact that it includes several 
different ways of generating electricity. These production technologies all differ in emission 
levels. Therefore, it was argued earlier in this section that the marginal cleaning cost can be 
viewed as a switching cost between different means of production.  This complicates the 
model above to some extent. The question is whether the complexity of the electricity market 
will make a quota-based system less effective. The answer to this is probably no. The 
legislators, in this case the European Commission, who impose the allowances on the market, 
are not concerned with how the emissions are reduced.  It is irrelevant whether the producers 
of electricity switch from coal to gas, or if they choose to invest in cleaning technology to 
reduce emission from existing production. The model implies that given a sufficient shortage 
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of quotas, one will obtain a reduction of emission. Furthermore, the reduction level can be 
accurately pinpointed by the amount of allowances allocated. These factors are still valid 
given the characteristics of the electricity market. The conclusion from this discussion is 
therefore that the quota-system has every opportunity to be successful. The results from the 
sub-sections regarding the experiences to this date from the ETS support this. The market 
infrastructure is developed and the liquidity of the market has improved significantly in the 
transition from the trial period to the Koyoto-period. The reduced volatility is also a positive 
factor worth noting in this regard.   
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4.4 Tax Incidence under Imperfect Competition 
 
The conclusion from the section concerning the competitive environment was that the market 
resembles an oligopoly with quantity competition. This description is assumed to be a 
satisfactory one at present, and this sub-section will present a theoretical model of the price 
effects of an imposed tax in this scenario.
12
 The model assumes symmetrical players in the 
market. This is not correct in the electricity market, due to the asymmetrical marginal costs of 
production. Nevertheless, this model shows in an elegant way, how imperfect competition can 
lead to surprising price effects from an imposed tax: 
 
iq Output firm             i
i
Q Q   = total output 
 
v = ad valorem tax on output         s = unit tax on output 
 
In the case of the quotas being imposed on the producers in the electricity market, the ad 
valorem tax can be set to zero. An ad valorem tax is value-based tax, in other words, it is 
dependent on the price being charged by the producers. The quotas are analogous to a unit 
tax. The tax is only dependent on the amount of output, in other words, the quotas are a 
function of only qi. This implies that emissions are proportional to output. In other words, the 
amount of emission from the electricity production is constant per unit of output. This 
condition is vital when arguing that the quotas are analogous to a unit tax.  
 
When assuming identical firms in a symmetrical equilibrium, and that the number of firms is 
fixed, we obtain: 
 
 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )i v i s iq p Nq c q q                  (4.4.1) 
                                                 
12
 Fullerton, D. and G. Metcalf, (2002), “Tax incidence, Working Paper”, 8829, NBER, Cambridge 
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First order condition: 
 
(1 ) '( ) (1 ) ( ) ' 0v v sp Nq q p Nq c              (4.4.2) 
 
Differentiating (4.4.2) with respect to s  yields: 
 
((1 ) ''( ) (1 ) ') (1 ) ' ''( ) 1 0v v v
s s s
dq dq dq
p Nq Nq p p N c q
d d d
  
  
       
  
   (4.4.3) 
 
Isolating yields: 
 
1
'' ''
(1 ) '( 1 )
' (1 ) '
s
v
v
dq
p Q cd
p N
p p
 


   

              (4.4.4) 
 
This expression can be simplified by defining: 
 
The producer price:   * (1 )vp p   
 
The elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand curve:   
''
'
p Q
p
   
 
The measure of the relative slope of the demand and cost curves:    
''
1
* '
c
k
p
   
 
Substituting these expressions into equation (4.4.4) yields: 
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 
            (4.4.5) 
 
 
These results enable us to study the price effects of an imposed tax: 
 
(1 ) '*
(1 ) '
(1 ) '( )
v
v
s s v
p Ndp dQ N
p
d d p N k N k


    

   
    
         (4.4.6) 
 
 
The expression from equation (4.4.6) enables us to study the theoretical price effects of an 
imposed unit tax. When setting N=1 we have the monopoly case. In this scenario over-
shifting (the price effect exceeds the size of the tax imposed) occurs when 1 0k     
 Linear costs implies that k=0 since c’’=0. Therefore, over-shifting occurs when 1 0   . 
Linear demand and costs can never lead to over-shifting. The derivative of the producer price 
with respect to the unit tax is then 0.5.  
 
The rationale for the over-shifting is that producers anticipate the reduction of demand due to the 
increased price. The firms will be interested in compensating the decrease in demand by 
charging a higher price. The elasticity of the slope of the demand curve will decide if the firms 
will increase the price more than the size of the tax. The key here is that the demand and cost 
curves can have different slopes for different parts of the curves. The relationship of the slopes of 
the cost and demand curves will be the crucial variable.  
 
The assumption of linear costs is plausible for electricity production. We can assume that there 
are insignificant economics of scale in this market. Holding on to the assumption of linear costs 
implies that the value of k is zero. In this scenario, equation (4.4.6) reveals that the tax incidence 
is solely dependent on the competitive structure on the supply side (represented by N) and the 
elasticity of demand (μ). This is interesting and in line with other parts of this thesis. The 
competitive structure of the market and the elasticity of demand have been devoted much 
attention earlier.  The above paragraph discussed potential over-shifting in the monopoly case, 
when the value of N is one. When the value of N increases, μ becomes less important. Over-
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shifting is maximized in the monopoly case. When N approaches infinity, the value of (4.4.6) 
converges towards one. A value of N which approaches infinity is the free competition scenario, 
and when the derivative of price with respect to the unit tax is one the consumers are forced to 
absorb the whole tax. This result is intuitively reasonable since a prefect competition scenario 
would imply price equal to marginal cost. The imposed tax could then be interpreted as an 
addition to the marginal cost of production. As the marginal cost curve is horizontal, the price 
would then be equal to the original marginal cost of production in plus the imposed tax. The 
variable μ is more difficult to describe. We have seen that the elasticity of demand is inelastic, at 
least in the short run. Discussing the slope of the demand curve at different points of the curve is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
The above model describes the economic factors that influence the price effects of the 
introduction of quotas. The next section is meant to elaborate and summarize the findings in 
order to examine the price effects in the electricity market. This model is a good benchmark in 
that regard.  
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4.5 Future Price Effects of the Quota Regime 
 
 
This last sub-section regarding the quotas will tie up the loose ends. The relevant results from 
the competition analysis will be related to the findings in this section. The purpose of this 
thesis has been to examine the price effects of the quotas. For the time being, we are almost 
five months into the second phase of the quota regime. The timing has enabled us to obtain 
data for the market price of the quotas. As we have seen, the value of the allowances is 
currently roughly 25 Euro/ton. There is no reason to believe that this value is ever going to 
decrease. It is more likely that the officials will tighten the allocation of the quotas in the 
years after the Koyoto-period, which ends in 2012. Therefore, it is a reliable conclusion to 
claim that the quotas have obtained a significantly positive market value, and that this value 
will at least amount to 25 Euro/ton.  
 
The challenge we are facing is to determine how this value will affect the electricity price in 
the Nordic market. A few models have been presented earlier, which more or less enlighten us 
in this matter.  The first step in order to determine the price effects is to decide which model is 
most fitting for our problem. This brings us back to the competition analysis. The conclusions 
from the analysis of the competitive environment were that the market was highly 
concentrated, and that market players compete with quantity as the decision variable.  
The congested transmission grid is the reason for the highly concentrated market. Developing 
this grid further is highly recommended by the Norwegian competition authorities. This will 
lead to a larger market and thereby enhance competition. The improvement of the grid is 
already under way, and will be continued in the near future. We will then probably see a 
convergence of the electricity prices in continental Europe. Since the generation of electricity 
on the continent consists of production based on fossil fuels, this will imply higher prices in 
the Nordic countries. It will also mean that the quota price will have a direct price effect on 
the Nordic market. The Nordic producers of hydro-power, which are large by the Nordic 
scale, will emerge as price takers instead of price setters. Therefore, it is not reasonable to 
assume a highly concentrated Nordic electricity market in the future. 
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The second result from the competition analysis is that the market participants compete in 
quantities. The argument is that the capacity constraints on the competitors soften the 
competition, and that every producer faces a residual demand. It is always difficult to 
represent a complex real market by means of simple models. Our result is partly based on the 
concentrated Nordic market, and the concurrent oligopoly. Based on the reasoning above, we 
have claimed that this scenario is not likely in the future. A larger electricity market will be 
better described by price competition with asymmetrical marginal costs of production. As we 
have seen, this model is already useful in explaining the price in the Nordic market. Under 
normal conditions the marginal cost of coal production can be identified from the spot- price 
on NordPool. This is of course based on the assumption that the marginal cost is well known.  
 
Consequently, the present market is best described as an oligopoly characterized by quantity 
competition, but in the future the price competition model is relevant.  This will be the basis 
for the task of predicting how the quotas are going to affect the future price level. The model 
of tax incidence under imperfect competition (Cournot oligopoly) shows that a tax can be 
passed onto consumers by a multiple exceeding one. This result is interesting, while the most 
recent conclusion represents a scenario which is not likely to be the case regarding the quotas. 
Models based on price competition yields, conveniently enough, more clear-cut conclusions. 
In a situation with price competition the tax burden will be completely passed onto the 
consumers in the Bertrand equilibrium. Also, the model of tax incidence with Cournot 
competition revealed that when N approaches infinity (perfect competition), the change in 
price with respect to the imposed unit tax was converges towards one.  
 
These results are based on the assumption of price equal to marginal cost in equilibrium. This 
is not too far off the mark in the electricity market with the price being determined by the cost 
of the marginal production technology. Furthermore, the result is based on a sufficient 
inelasticity of demand so that the demanded quantity does not decrease significantly. An 
elastic demand relative to supply could lead to a situation where a production technology with 
lower marginal cost of production would become more price-decisive. This would make the 
discussion of the price effects of the quotas more complex. Earlier we have seen that the 
demand for electricity has to be considered inelastic in the short to medium run. The last 
condition that needs to be addressed here is that the pecking order of the production 
technologies is not going to be altered. In other words, coal must not lose its competitive 
advantage compared to e.g. natural gas. The discussion from the preceding sub-section 
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regarding the competitiveness of coal compared to natural gas revealed that this last 
assumption is also reasonable.  
 
 
 5.0 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The answer to the main problem of the thesis is thus that the burden of the quotas will be 
passed on to consumers. The theoretical models which are implemented indicate that the 
value of the quotas as whole will be represented in the end-user price. We have also reached 
interesting conclusions regarding other aspects of the quota regime. The empirical data 
retrieved from the European Climate Exchange give reasons for optimistic future outlooks for 
the ETS. The market infrastructure is established and the liquidity is improving as we speak.  
The following paragraph will summarize the findings that lead to this result. The latter parts 
of the concluding remarks will discuss the reliability of the results as well as the possibilities 
for future research in this field.   
 
The section regarding the competitive environment focused on the present conditions in the 
Nordic electricity market. The results based on this discussion revealed that the market 
resembles an oligopoly with quantity competition. The demand was labeled as inelastic in the 
short run. These findings would indicate that the relevant model would be tax incidence under 
imperfect competition with Cournot-competition. The complexity of the market distorts the 
picture. Another finding in the competitive analysis is that the Nordic market will be 
integrated with the market in continental European market in near future. This means that the 
present market structure will change. This problem concerning the competitive structure and 
how this affects the relevant models was dealt with in section four, which presented the price-
effects of the quotas. Section three discussed the price formation in the electricity market.  
This section was important in order to understand the factors which influence the price in the 
Nordic electricity market. One of the important results in this section is that the marginal cost 
of coal-based production determines the price under normal circumstances.  As a 
consequence, the connection between the value of the quotas and the price formation in the 
Nordic market is easier to grasp. The reason is that the quotas will have a direct effect on 
coal-based production, and the quotas will thereby also have an indirect effect on the price in 
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the Nordic market. The section regarding the price formation argues that the model of price 
competition with asymmetrical marginal costs of production has a significant explanatory 
power. Section four tries to tie up all the loose ends, in order to establish the price effects of 
the introduction of quotas. The biggest challenge in this regard is deciding which model is 
most relevant in order to determine the price effects of the C02-quotas. The answer to this is 
that price competition is the optimal model because of the future integration of the markets.   
 
The answer to the main problem is based on the assumptions which are thoroughly discussed 
in section four, but the most important condition is possibly the claim that the quotas can be 
interpreted as a unit tax. This argument is a building block in the thesis. The fact that we can 
model the price-effects of the quotas as a unit tax makes it possible to use well known 
economic theory. The problem of imposing a tax on production has been thoroughly 
examined before. The models which are presented in this thesis enable us to obtain the results 
which were presented in the last section. The main argument for treating the quotas as a unit 
tax is that the quantity of emissions is constant per unit of output (electricity production). This 
is, as previously explained a reasonable claim.  
 
The preceding theoretical analysis leads us to the conclusion that the value of the quotas as a 
whole will be passed on to the consumers in the form of a higher electricity price.  This claim 
is based on strict assumptions. Firstly, the elasticity of demand needs to completely inelastic. 
Secondly, we have to assume that the producers of coal do not have significant operating 
margins on their production. The last assumption is that the Nordic hydro producers are 100 
percent price takers in the market. The last assumption is probably the most robust condition 
in the long run. The result of future integration of the European electricity markets, and 
subsequent convergence of prices, is possibly the most reliable conclusion in this thesis. In 
line with preceding discussions, the first two assumptions are also legitimate. Nevertheless, 
the most important source of uncertainty from the results is the future value of the quotas. The 
problem of predicting the exact size of the quota price which will show up in the end price of 
electricity will be difficult or impossible to calculate accurately. Therefore, one way of 
formulating the obtained result is that a significant part of the future value of the CO2-quotas 
will be passed on to Nordic consumers.  
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The thesis has uncovered interesting results, to a large degree based on a competitive analysis 
and the use of models with observed explanatory power. The results are obtained by a strictly 
theoretical approach. The aim is to use theory to anticipate the future of the electricity market. 
This is naturally relatively difficult, and the obtained results are associated with a significant 
amount of uncertainty.  As mentioned several times earlier, the ETS has only just begun. An 
empirical study would probably be difficult to perform at this point. The problems which are 
studied here would rather be perfect for empirical work in near future. The theoretical 
foundation formed here would be a useful basis in that regard. The quotas have already 
obtained a market value which has been estimated to be about 20-25 EUR/metric ton. This 
means that one should be able to study effects of the quotas on the electricity price relatively 
soon. The problem one will encounter in this regard is the complexity of the competitive 
environment, which at present is mainly caused by the congested transmission grid.  
Nevertheless, this new market gives hold to several interesting aspects worth studying for 
additional and future research.   
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